Post by account_disabled on Jan 10, 2024 10:50:14 GMT
institute of benign retroactivity to different penalties has been ruled out" [4] . Following this decision, Carf Summary nº 155 was approved : "The fine provided for in article 33 of Law nº 11,488/07 is not to be confused with the penalty of forfeiture in article 23, item V, of Decree Law nº 1,455/76, which rules out the application of benign retroactivity defined in article 106, II, 'c', of the National Tax Code ." As a result, the matter was consolidated within the scope of administrative litigation. In the Judiciary, in turn, the Federal Regional Courts (TRF) of the 4th Region [5] and the 3rd Region have ruled in accordance with this interpretation [6] . However, the 2nd Panel of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) has already recognized.
t interposition of effective third parties (art. 23, V, of Decree-Law no. 1,455/1976) and presumed (§ 2 of Decree-Law no. 1,455/1976 and art. 33 of Law No. 11,488/2007), when it is impossible to apply the penalty of forfeiture provided for in § 1 of said decree. 2. The systematic interpretation of the aforementioned provisions denotes that Phone Number List cases of importation through fraudulent interposition of a third party – irrelevant whether effective or presumed – admit the first application of the penalty of confiscation of goods and, if this is not possible, the consequent application of the fine corresponding to the value of the operation to the hidden importer (§ 3 of Decree-Law no. 1,455/1976), as well as the application of a fine of 10% of the value of the operation to the overt importer (art. 33 of Law no. 11,488/2007). 3. The .
logic adopted by the Court of origin makes perfect sense, since, with the penalty of forfeiture of the goods resulting from fraudulent interposition — whether effective or presumed —, the assets that are really sought to be achieved belong to the hidden importer. Now, if the penalty of forfeiture itself arises precisely from the conclusion that there was fraudulent interposition, that is, that the import that took place was paid for by another person in violation of the governing legislation, it is necessary to conclude that the purpose of the rule, as a whole, it is to reach the assets of the real importer. 4. It is for no other reason that the legislator, also seeking to subject the ostensible importer to a sanction, stipulated a fine of 10% of the .
t interposition of effective third parties (art. 23, V, of Decree-Law no. 1,455/1976) and presumed (§ 2 of Decree-Law no. 1,455/1976 and art. 33 of Law No. 11,488/2007), when it is impossible to apply the penalty of forfeiture provided for in § 1 of said decree. 2. The systematic interpretation of the aforementioned provisions denotes that Phone Number List cases of importation through fraudulent interposition of a third party – irrelevant whether effective or presumed – admit the first application of the penalty of confiscation of goods and, if this is not possible, the consequent application of the fine corresponding to the value of the operation to the hidden importer (§ 3 of Decree-Law no. 1,455/1976), as well as the application of a fine of 10% of the value of the operation to the overt importer (art. 33 of Law no. 11,488/2007). 3. The .
logic adopted by the Court of origin makes perfect sense, since, with the penalty of forfeiture of the goods resulting from fraudulent interposition — whether effective or presumed —, the assets that are really sought to be achieved belong to the hidden importer. Now, if the penalty of forfeiture itself arises precisely from the conclusion that there was fraudulent interposition, that is, that the import that took place was paid for by another person in violation of the governing legislation, it is necessary to conclude that the purpose of the rule, as a whole, it is to reach the assets of the real importer. 4. It is for no other reason that the legislator, also seeking to subject the ostensible importer to a sanction, stipulated a fine of 10% of the .